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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ROAD COlVIlVIISSION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

COl\IMERCIAL S E C U R I T Y, /
I~ANK,
as Administrator of the
Estate of GEORGE E. KENDELL, Deceased and IRENE H.
KENDELL,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
10834

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEl\ilENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an eminent domain proceeding instituted
by the State of Utah, by and through its Road Commission, involving commercial properties owned by
defendants located at the mouth of 'Veber Canyon in
the town of Uintah, YVeber County, Utah.
1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried before a jury on September
8, 1966, with the Honorable John F. \Vahlquist presiding. The jury awarded respondents the sum of $22,500.00 for the 2.89 acres actually taken by appellant
and $37,000.00 for damage to the land remaining after
the taking, making a total award of $59,500.00. The
Court entered judgment on the verdict on November
30, 1966. On September 20, 1966, appellant filed a
motion for a remittitur or a new trial, in the alternative, which motion was denied by the Court on October
13, 1966. Appellant then filed another motion for a
new trial on October 24, 1966, which was denied by
the Court on January 26, 1967. Appellant then ap·
pealed from the judgment of the Court entered or:
the verdict.
RELIEF' SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmation of the jury verdict
and the judgment entered thereon by the Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State of Utah filed eminent domain proceedings in the District Court of Weber County, on June
24, 1964, naming George Kernlell and Irene H. Kendell as defendants therein (R-1). George Kendell had
just died on June 17, 1964, and Commercial Security
Bank, as Administrator of .Mr. Kendell's estate was
2

substituted as a party. ( T-56, R-15). Process was
served on respondent Irene H. Kendell and respondent
Commercial Security Bank on June 25, 1964, and an
order of immediate occupancy was signed by the Court
on July 6, 1964 ( R-4, R-51). These are the only parties
iuvolYed in this appeal and the other named respondents
in appellant's brief are in no way involved.
The subject property was purchased by the Kendells in 1939 and consisted of a total tract of property
of 4.51 acres ( T-55 & Exhibit B). Appellant actually
condemned 4.18 acres consisting of 1.29 acres representing an existing right of way which appellant had
through respondents' property and 2.89 acres to be
taken by appellant for widening the existing highway
and for an exit ramp (Exhibits B, 2-R). The 2.89
acres taken consisted mainly of property located on
the 'vest of Highlvay 89 except for a piece of property
located east and adjacent to the existing Highway
89 right of way with approximate dimensions of 105
feet long by 7 .5 feet in width on the north and 30 feet
in width on the south (Exhibit B). Respondents were
then left with a tract of property approximately .33
of an acre located to the east of the Highway 89 rightof-way and to the south of Highway 30 where both
highways intersected prior to the improvements by the
State . (Exhibits B, 3). For purposes of convenience
the .33 of an acre not condemned by appellant
will be ref erred to hereafter as the East property and
the 2 .89 acres condemned by appellant will be referred
to as the YV est property.
-·-- -

3

.·J.!1

At the time of taking, th eEast property consisted
of motel cabins to the rear of the property, a service
station providing gas, oil, lubrication and minor mechanical repairs, a grocery store and lunch counter,
and an antique shop (Exhibit 2-l).
The \Vest property consisted of a large tract of
ground with frontage on Highway 89 of 736.3 feet
and in a triangular shape of considerable depth on the
south end of the property (Exhibit 3).
At the time of taking, both the East property
and the West property were zoned C-2, which allowed
the Kendells to have a service station, general store
and other related commercial activities ( T-8-9).
After the order of immediate occupancy was obtained, appellant proceeded to ban-icade off Highway
30 east of the subject property and rerouted Highway
30 to the south of the subject property and installed
a fence running east and west 1280 feet from the barricade to the southwest corner of the East property
(Exhibits 3, 2-A, 2-L, 2-M, 2-N). The fence then went
north and parallel to Highway 89 from the southwest
corner of the East property 827 feet, or approximately
300 yards (Exhibits 3.2-F, 2-H, and 2-J).
The East property, besides having a portion of
it taken which necessitated removal of one section of
gas pumps, was now completely fenced in and barricaded except for the small access road approximately
300 yards north of the subject property (Exhibits B,
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3, T.59-uO). The 'Vest property was, of course, completely taken by appellant.
The jury awarded respondents the sum of $22,500.00 for the ::?.89 acres actually taken and awarded
respondents $37,000.00 as damages to the East property, making a total verdict of $59,500.00 ( R-29) .

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY 'VAS
'VELL 'VITHIN THE EVIDENCE AND \VAS
XOT GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
PASSION OR PREJUDICE.
The first case cited by appellant is the case of
Geary v. Cain, u9 Utah 340, 255 P. 416, which involves
an assault and battery charge on the person of a woman
where a jury was quite generous in both actual and
exemplary damages. This case, however, bears very
little resemblance to the case before the Court. However, a very important rule of law which is material to
the case under discussion is discussed at page 419 of
the opinion as follows:
"Ordinarily, if there is any substantial evidence to sustain a verdict in an action at law, this
Court is powerless to set it aside. Such is the
general rule reiterated and reaffirmed at almost
every term of the court."
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The other case cited by appellant is the case of
Jensen v. Denver & R.G.R. Co., 44 Utah 100, 138 P.
1185, which involved the death of a 14 year old bov
while he was walking on defendant's railroad track.
At page 1192 of the opinion the court lays down the
following rule setting forth the conditions upon which
a trial court may vacate a verdict and order a new trial:
"But, before the court is justified to do that,
it should clearly be made to appear that the jury
totally mistook or disregarded the rules of law
by which the damages were to be regulated,
or wholly misconceived or disregarded all the
evidence ,and by so doing committed gross and
palpable error by rendering a verdict so enormous or outrageous or unjust as to be attributable to neither the charge nor the evidence, but
only to passion or prejudice. Whether a new
trial should or should not be granted on this
ground, of necessity, must largely rest within
the sound discretion of the trial court."
It would seem that according to appellant's own
authorities the judgment of the trial court should be
affirmed if there is any substantial evidence supporting
the jury verdict. See also to this effect People v. Swazey,
6 Utah 93, 21 P. 400; and Stephens Ranch and Live·
stock Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 48 Utah 528,
161 P. 459.

The verdict of the jury was well within the evidence
as the following testimony will attest. Verna Aaron
testified that she was working at the store at the time
of the taking and described the place as "dead" after
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the fence was installed around the property by appellant ( T-46). She testified that prior to the installation
of the fence that the Kendell's received business from
\Vyoming ranchers coming down Weber Canyon, tourists, local customers, and traffic going to and from Salt
Lake City and Hill Air Force Base ( T-47 -48) . She
testified that after the fence was installed business consisted mainly of tourists running out of gas and purchasing small amounts of gas which could be handed
over the fence to them, and also from the construction
workers who were involved in the construction of the
new freeway ( T-48-49). When asked the question
"And do you get any of the business from Hill Field
traffic or traffic going from Salt Lake to Ogden?"
she answered, "No, they don't know how to get in"
( T-49) . She then concluded her testimony by testifying
that since the installation of the fence it was "just
like you were in jail, fenced off" ( T-49-50) .
Earl Kendell testified that he had worked at the
store and service station for a substantial period of
time and that the piece of property taken by the State
east of and adjacent to the Highway 89 right-of-way
necessitated the removal of one island of gas pumps
consisting of three individual pumps (T-51, 59, 60).
Adelbert R. Craven was called as an expert witness and testified that he had been a licensed engineer
for the past 45 years and then described Exhibit 3, pertaining to the improvements made by appellant and
the exact acreage involved in the taking (T-11-13).
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In concluding his testimony he testified that he had
been familiar with the property prior to the taking
and that since the fence was installed he found it very
difficult to get into the property and on one occasion
had to go part way up \Veber Canyon and turn around
and come back in order to get into the property ( T12, 15).
The Uintah City Clerk testified as to the pertinent
zoning ordinance and testified that both the East and
\Vest properties were in a C-2 zone, which authorized
a service st ation, grocery store and similar commercial
activities ( T-8-9) . There was further testimony to the
effect that the \Vest property was purchased by the
Kendell's to be used as commercial property with the
eventual establishment of a service station and related
commercial activities thereon ( T-51, 53).
Mr. G. T. Hone was called as an expert witness
and testified that he had been in the oil business in
numerous capacities since 1922, and had been an executive in the Sinclair Refining Company ( T-20-21). He
further testified that he either owned or leased 30 serYice stations in the Ogden area at the time of his appearance in court ( T-21). He testified that he had been
acquainted with the Kendell's since 1935 and had delivered gas and petroleum products to them since that
time ( T-22-23). He testified that the highest and best
use of the East property was a service station and
store site, which was the use they were presently being
put to, and that at the time of the taking the market
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rnlue of the East property was from $60,000.00 to
$70,000.00 ( T-24-25). He testified that he was familiar
with the improvements that had been made by appellant
and that because of these the market value of the East
property after the taking was nominal ( T-25-26). In
response to a question concerning the value of the East
property after the taking, :Nlr. Hone testified as follows
(T-26):
"A. From our standpoint it wouldn't be worth
anything because we couldn't keep an operator
in it as far as operating a service station is concerned. There isn't enough business there. Now,
.Mr. Kendell's daughter has been operating the
place and the gasoline business has gone down
to practically nothing there.
"Q. As an owner of service stations and as a
rentor and lessor of service stations, would you
have this property as a service station site yourself?

"A. No, I wouldn't buy it. I wouldn't want to
buy it for anything.
"Q. 'Vould you want to run it?

"A. No."
Mr. Hone testified that the highest and best use
of the 'Vest property was a truck stop and service
station site and that the market value at the time of
the taking was from $25,000.00 to $30,000.00 ( T-2324).

Earl Peterson was called as an expert witness and
testified that he was a real estate appraiser and owner
9

of the Real Estate Exchange located in Ogden, Utah
( T-32-33). He testified that the highest and best use
of the East property was a service station and store
site and that the market value at the time of the taking
was $35,000.00 ( T-34) . He further testified that the
market value of the East property after the taking
was nominal ( T-34) .
Peterson testified that the highest and best
use of the 'Vest property was a service station or truck
stop and that the market value at the time of the taking
was $40,000.00 (T-33).
~Ir.

Mr. Earl Jones was called as an expert witness
and testified that he was the owner of Blackburn &
Jones Company dealing in real estate and insurance
and that he had been appraising property in Ogden for
21 years ( T-38-39). He testified that the highest and
best use of the East property was a service station
and store site and that the market value at the time of
the taking was $40,000.00 ( T-40) . He testified that the
value of the East property after the taking was nominal
( T -40) . As a basis for his opinion he had a list of 42
sales of service station sites in the area during the previous six years ( T-44 ) .
Mr. Jones further testified that the highest and
best use of the West property was a service station site
and that the market value at the time of the taking
was $35,000.00 (T-39).
Mrs. Irene Kendell was called as a witness and as
a part-owner of the subject property. She testified that
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the East property at the time of the taking was worth
from $60,000 to $7 5,000 ( T-58) . She testified that
the market value of the \Vest property at the time of
the taking was from $30,000 to $40,000 ( T-57) .
It seems clear that the verdict of the jury was well
within the evidence introduced at the trial. Under the
Ctah eases and the evidence it seems obvious that the
verdict was not against the weight of the evidence and
was not the result of passion or prejudice.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
~OT GIVING AN INSTRUCTION PERTAINING TO THE RIGHT OF AN OlVNER OF
PRIVATE PROPERTY TO HAVE A PUBLIC
THOROUGHFARE ADJACENT TO HIS
PROPERTY.
It should be noted that appellant's argument on
this point has no bearing on the \Vest property since
the 2.89 acres taken abutted Highway 89 at the time
of the taking and subsequent improvements had no
bearing on this parcel since it was completely taken.

Appellant's argument under Point II goes to the
damages sustained by the East property which was left
in respondents' ownership after appellant's improvements. It should be noted at this point that respondents
are not contending that the State did not have the
right to move Higlnrny ao slightly to the south of
respondents' property but are asserting that the fenc11

ing off of respondents' property, causing a loss of access
and the damages caused by the taking of the piece of
property east of the Highway 89 right-of-way, are
compensable damages under the Utah law. Ergo, appellant's contention on this point has little, if any, materiality and persuasive effect in the matter.
Appellant made no request to the trial court for
the instruction referred to in its argument ( R-28A).
In cases where parties have failed to request particular
instructions the Utah Court has ref used to find error
on the part of the trial court.
In the case of Salt Lake & U.R. Co. v. Schramm,
56 Utah 53, 189 P. 90, the Utah Supreme Court made
the following observation at page 92 of the opinion:
"If the plaintiff desired more specific instructions than given by the court, it became the
duty of the plaintiff to frame and present them
for the court's consideration. This the plaintiff
did not do ... Not having made a written request
to the court to charge the jury in the particulars
complained of, the court's failure to do so will
not be regarded as error."
In Taylor v. Los Angeles & S.L.R. Co., 61 Utah
524, 216 P. 239, the Utah Court made the following
observation at page 242 of the opinion and thereafter
listed numerous authorities in support thereof:
"It is generally held that error cannot be based
on the failure to· give a particular instruction
"
when no request therefor is made .
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In State v. Valdez, 432 P.2d 53, decided by this
court on September 29, 1967, where the defendant
made no written or oral request for an instruction on
an included offense, and where this court agreed that
the defendant was entitled to such an instruction if
he had so desired, the court held that there was no
prejudicial error for failure of the trial court to give
such instruction in the absence of a request therefor.
At page 54 of the opinion, Justice Crockett made the
following observation:
.. If the defendant had desired that procedure,
it was his duty to submit a proper request in
writing, or at least to clearly indicate to the
court orally that such was his desire."
And further, at page 55:
"Although the record does show oral exception
to the instructions relating to consideration of
the evidence concerning motive and prior convictions of felony, the grounds now complained
of were not mentioned. The purpose of exceptions is to assist the court in giving correct
instructions. This purpose is best served by calling its attention to what is wrong and suggesting
what is right. But the purpose of this procedure
is not to permit a party to take an exception
upon one ground, and then if he is convicted,
use a different ground than he disclosed to the
court to obtain a reversal. Accordingly, if the
defendant has not stated a correct basis for
objection to an instruction, he cannot wait until
after he loses, and then complain about it for
the first time."
It should be noted in the instant case before this
court that appellant neither requested the instruction
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it alleges should have been given or took an exceptiou
to the court's instructions pertaining to the point raised
in its argument on appeal (R-28A, T-101).
}'or cases with similar holdings to the Valdez case
see State v. McNaughton, 92 Utah 99, 58 P.2d 5, and
State v. Yee Foo Lun, 45 Utah 531, 147 P. 488.
Appellant cites the case of Robinette v. Price, 74
Utah 512, 280 P. 736, which involved the closing of a
portion of a street in Price, Utah. The court framed
the issue of the appeal as whether or not the appellant
had shown such a special interest in the portion of the
street closed and discontinued as to entitle him to compensation. The court found that the appellant had "as
ready ingress and egress" to his property as he had
prior to the closing of the portion of the street. The
court used the following language at pages 736-7 of
the opinion:
"Tenth Street running south from the highway on which the north boundary of plaintiff's
parcel abuts was not closed or discontinued. It
is alleged in the complaint that the closing of
the portion of 10th Street which was closed prevented ingress and egress to and from plain·
tiff's property. But such claim is not supported
by the evidence. The evidence, without dispute,
shows that the highway on which plaintiff's parcel abutted affords him as ready ingress and
egress (emphasis added) to and from the north
boundarv of his land as it did before the portion
of 10th Street was closed and discontinued, and
that the south portion of his parcel was not disturbed or interfered with in any particular."
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This case hardly fits the Kendell case where a portion of the East property was actually taken which
makes the Kendell case a proper subject of severance
damages and also an almost complete loss of access
by the fencing in of the Kendell property reducing a
rnluable commercial site to a tract of property of
nominal value.
Appellant relies heavily on Springville Bankiny
('ompan,1; v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100, 349 P.2d 157,
where a concrete island in the middle of Main Street
in SpringYille was constructed eliminating U turns and
left tur11s. The court held that this was not compensable
under C tah law. The primary concern of the court was
the fact that if the State had to pay for loss of access
to abutting property owners every time an island was
placed i11 a through highway, the expense would be prohibitive. This case, however, is not controlling in the
Kendell case since even though islands were placed in
the through highway in front of the Kendell property,
such construction was never claimed at the trial as a
basis for damages to the Kendells. The fencing off
of a senice station and store site and the actual taking
of a portion of such property for State purposes is
hardly analagous with a case involving the mere construction of an island in the middle of a highway.
The measure of damages in an eminent domain
proceeding is based on the provisions of 78-34-10, Utah
Code Annotated, 19.53, and Article I, § 22 of the Constitution of Utah which provides as follows:
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"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation."
The following authorities are cited for the proposition that the Kendell family \Vas properly awarded
damages in the case at bar under Utah law, general
law, and sound reason based upon balancing the equities of the public and the private land owner.
In the case of DoollJ Block v. Salt Lake Rapid
Transit Company, 9 Utah 31, 33 P. 229, where the
respondents were owners of certain lots situated on 2nd
South Street in Salt Lake City, and where appellants
were trying to install railroad tracks, telephone lines
and wires along the street which would have interfered
with respondents' access to their respective properties;
the Court found that the respondents "are the owners
of equitable easements in fee of rights of access, ingress,
and egress to their respective lots in front thereof in
the street, and entitled to the free and unobstructed
use of that portion of said street as a means of access,
... " The Court went on to say that the right of access,
light and air constitute the principal values of such
property and that "such privileges are easements in fee,
-incorporeal hereditaments,-and form a part of the
estate in the lots." The Court further indicated that
these rights "are appurtenances to the land which cannot be so embarrassed or abridged as to materially interfere with its proper use and enjoyment, and they are,
in effect, property of which the owners cannot be deprived without due compensation."
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The similarity of the Dooly case and the instant
ease is close since .l\lr. and .Mrs. Kendell had exercised
their easement of access from U. S. Highway 89 and
U. S. Highway 30 since 1940. The Kendell case is substantially stronger since they had business property
of a nature and type that used the access easement many
times a day.
In State v. Fourth District Court, et al., 94 Utah
384, 78 P.2d 502, where plaintiffs were owners of lots
abutti11g Center Street in Provo City and defendants
were proceeding to construct a viaduct on said street
which would have raised the grade of the street in
front of plaintiffs' properties and would have affected
their access, the Court held (page 510 of the opinion)
that if such constructio11 constituted either a taking or
a damaging of the property of the abutting landowners,
then steps should be taken for proper compensation
therefor.
In the leading Utah case of Utah Road Commission v. Hansen, H Utah 2d 305, 383 P.2d 917, where
the State was taking 1.84 acres of an 18.06 acre tract
of defendant's land located on the north side of 21st
South Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, which property
was used for def enda11t' s auto wrecking business, and
where a jury had awarded defendant $21,500.00 for
the land taken and $3,-t.00.00 as se\'erance damages to
the remaining land, the Court cited the Dooly Block
'l'. S(/lt L(/kc R(/pid 1'rruzsit Company case with apprornl and reaffirmed its position that an established
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easement of access by an abutting property owner is
compensable under a condemnation proceeding. The
Court further ruled in the Han sen case that an easement of access that was appurtenant to the property
taken was a proper element of damages and that 1
existing easement to the remaining land not taken was
compensable. The Court at page 920 defined an easement as follows:

a;

" . . . an easement of access contemplates a
travelled way from the property to the highway."
It should be noted that the Hans en case is a 1963
case and is subsequent to the cases cited by appellant
in its brief. It should further be noted that the Kendell
situation fits the provisions of the Han.sen case in that
they had an easement of access from the two highways
to their store and service station property since 1940.
The Kendell case is stronger than the Hansen
case since part of the East property was actually taken
necessitating the removal of a complete section of gas
pumps in addition to the damages for loss of access.
In Jacobsen v. Incorporated Village of Russell
Gardens, 201 N.Y.S. 2d 183, the New York Court held
that the city had no right to remove the curb and erect
barriers at the curb line which would block plaintiff's
easement of access to the public street without compensation therefor.
In Brownlow v. O' Donoghue Brothers, 276 F.
636, 22 ALR 939, (District of Columbia Court of Ap-
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peals), where the defendants owned a service station
with two entrances to the property on Irving Street
and one entrance on 14th Street, and where the commissioners of the District of Columbia proposed to
close the 14th Street entrance and compel defendants
to use only the Irving Street entrance, the Court held
that defendants were entitled to have ingress and egress
from their property oB both streets and based its decision on the grounds that it was obvious than an entrance
to a place of business such as defendants' business from
a street over which there was much travel is far more
rnluable than one from a street where the traffic is
light. The court said at page 941:
" 'For example, an abutting owner's right of
access to and from the street, subject only to
legitimate public regulation, is as much his property as his right to the soil within his boundary
lines. . . . 'Vhen he is deprived of such right
of access or of any other easement connected
with the use and ~njoyment of his property,
other than by the exercise of legitimate public
regulation he is deprived of his property.

" 'It was further seen that he had certain
rights not shared by the public at large, special
and peculiar to himself. and which arose out
of the very relation of his lot to the street in
front of it; ... and that these rights, whether
the bare fee of the streets was in the lot owner
or in the citv, were rights of property, and as
such ought t~ be and were as sacred from legislative invasion as his right to the lot itself."
In 73 ALR 2d 652, at pagei 6.f6-7, it is stated as
follows:

19

. "The overwhelming weight of aut~ority recogmzes as a statement of general prmciple, that
the right of access to and from a public highway is one of the incidents of ownership or occu.
pancy of land abutting thereon, of which the
owner cannot be deprived without compensation,
whether the fee to the way is in the public or the
abutter.
"YVhen cases throughout the annotation are
analyzed, it will become apparent that most of
them involve the complaints of businesses, notably gasoline stations, which require _generous
access (emphasis added) for a profitable opera·
tion."
,
In 43 ALR 2d 1072, which is an annotation relat·
ing to an abutting owner's right to damages for loss of
access because of the installation of a limited- access
highway, the following observation is made at page
1074:

"'Vhere an established 'land-service road' in '
which the normal right of access had already
come into being, is converted into a limited-access way in such a manner that the existing
rights of access are destroyed, the owners of
such rights are entitled to compensation, exactly
as they would be if such rights were destroyed
by any other type of construction."
1

And further, at page 1077:
"A difficult problem is presented when, because of the conversion of an ordinary highway
into a limited-access way, the right of direct
access is destroyed but there is available a means
of indir~ct access either by other existing streets
or by the construction of service or feeder roads
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upon which the abutting landowner can move
from his property to one of the authorized entrys
to the limited-access roadway.
"The cases luwe apparently recognized that
the landowner is entitled to compensation where
his direct right of access is taken, even though
other but less satisfactorv, means of access are
available."
·
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CONCLUSION
It seems clear in the subject case that the jury
awarded respondents what they felt was the market
value of the \Vest property at the time of the taking
based upon the highest and best use as testified by
respondents' expert witnesses. It is further evident that
the jury, in awarding damages to the East property,
considered the loss of the portion of the East property
which necessitated the removal of a section of gas
pumps, and further considered the loss of the easement
of access which had existed since 1940 because of the
fence installation. The jury obviously felt that the
feeder road constructed by the State, with its entrance
located 827 feet to the north of the subject property,
was not sufficient and reasonable access for service
station and store use. The verdict of the jury was well
within the evidence and the verdict of the jury and
the judgment entered thereon by the trial court should
be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
FROERER, HOROWITZ, PARKER,
RICHARDS, THORNLEY & CRITCHLO'V
Richard H. Thornley
Attorneys for Respondents
200 Kiesel Building

Ogden, Utah
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